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Abstract.  
This paper outlines an innovative software development that 
utilizes Quality of Service (QoS) and parallel technologies in 
Cisco Catalyst Switches to increase the analytical performance 
of a Network Intrusion Detection System (NIDS) when 
deployed in high-speed networks. We have designed a real 
network to present experiments that use a Snort NIDS to 
demonstrate the weaknesses of NIDSs, such as inability to 
process multiple packets and propensity to drop packets in 
heavy traffic and high-speed networks without analysing them. 
We tested Snort’s analysis performance, gauging the number of 
packets sent, analysed, dropped, filtered, injected, and 
outstanding. We suggest using QoS configuration technologies 
in a Cisco Catalyst 3560 Series Switch and parallel Snort NIDSs 
to improve NIDS performance and to reduce the number of 
dropped packets. Our results show that our novel configuration 
improves performance. 
Keywords: network security; intrusion detection system; parallel; 
Quality of Service  
I. INTRODUCTION 
In order to provide new developments and the highest-
quality services, companies implement the latest technologies 
in their infrastructure. A company’s network plays a vital role 
in its business projects; it can achieve success in its business 
career by keeping its computer network up-to-date with the 
latest software and security techniques. Reliability and safety 
are the major concerns in enabling a company to achieve 
success and boost its progress. However, these networks can 
also be considered a major risk in any business project. 
Security issues have increased as technology has 
advanced. Fuchsberger [1] reported that, according to a 
survey conducted by Federal Bureau of investigation and 
Crime Scene of investigation (FBI/CSI), viruses are behind 
many attacks on business networks. Moreover, denial of 
service (DoS) attacks and unauthorized user access (which 
can be initiated from external or internal LAN sources) have 
also increased dramatically. 
It is also noticeable that nowadays there are powerful 
intrusion tools available, allowing hackers to attack networks 
even if they know little of the software. Attackers can now 
use several tools simultaneously to achieve an objective. 
However, 9th Annual Worldwide Infrastructure Security 
Report and ATLAS data 2013[2] report said the number of 
DDoS attack has grown significantly, nearly doubling on a 
year-to-year basis between 2006 and 2010. The size peaks of 
attacks in 2013 has been increased by over 200 percent form 
previous year, with the largest reported attack at 309 Gbps, 
and with multiple respondents reporting attacks larger than 
100 Gbps – the previous largest reported attack size [2]. 
Additionally, in 2013 ATLAS observed more than 8x the 
number of attacks over 20 Gbps tracked as compared to 2012 
[2]. 
 
 
Figure 1: Largest DDoS Attack Reported by Arbor Networks [2]. 
Therefore, security products such as firewalls, 
vulnerability assessment tools such as antivirus programs and 
Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs), security appliances such 
as the Cisco ASA 5500 series, etc., may reduce the risk of 
attacks. However, even these measures are not 100 percent 
effective in protecting networks. As a result, multiple 
products are combined together to strengthen the network 
security seals. 
1. Firewall 
In order to secure a corporate network or sub-network, 
network traffic is usually filtered according to criteria such as 
origin, destination, protocol or service, typically through 
dedicated routers called firewalls. Firewalls are a common 
security defence and nowadays are treated as an integral part 
of every network. They are now part of every network 
gateway, preventing external intruders from gaining access to 
local or private networks [3]. 
A firewall may be software or hardware; its functionality 
is based on filtering mechanisms specified by a set of rules, 
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known as a policy, which can protect a system from flooding 
attacks. The fundamental function of a firewall is to sort 
packets according to allow/deny rules, based on header-filed 
information [3]. 
The disadvantage of firewalls is that they cannot fully 
protect an internal network; they are unable to stop internal 
attacks [4, 5]. For example, malicious and unwanted web 
traffic can go through a firewall to strike and damage a 
protected computer system without a hitch.  
A firewall is just a set of rules such as to allow or deny 
protocols, ports or an IP address [3]. Today’s Denial of 
Service (DoS) attacks are too complex for firewalls because it 
they cannot distinguish good traffic from DoS attack traffic 
[3]. 
2. Antivirus programs 
Computer viruses are programs which cause computer 
failure and damage computer data. Especially in a network 
environment, a computer virus poses an immeasurable threat 
and can be very destructive [5]. Antivirus programs are 
software that can be installed onto a computer in order to 
detect, prevent and make decisions regarding whether to 
quarantine or delete malicious programs such as malware, 
worms or viruses.  
Although antivirus programs monitor the integrity of data 
files against illegal modifications, they are unable to block 
unwanted network traffic intended to damage the network. 
Anti-threat software is installed only at explicit points of the 
servers, such as the interface between the network segment to 
be protected and outside environments [6]. 
3. Intrusion detection systems (IDSs) 
The firewall is an interesting technique and provides the 
benefit of added security to strengthen a network when used 
in conjunction with an Intrusion Detection System. IDS 
technologies detect and react to unauthorised access to 
network systems, providing real-time monitoring of network 
traffic [7]. 
IDSs can be software- or hardware-based, or can be a 
combination of both. Hardware-based IDSs are effective for 
large organizations and companies, but are very expensive. 
However, software-based IDSs running on the same devices 
or servers can identify and deal with attacks generated from 
inside or from outside the network, and can also protect the 
security policies of that network and their internal threats. It 
is an interesting and beneficial way to implement a technique 
that can be used to multitask and provide extra security 
techniques to strengthen your network along with an IDS by 
deploying a firewall or any other technique [7, 8 and 9]. 
Intrusion detection (ID) is one of the most tested and 
reliable technologies to monitor incoming and outgoing 
network traffic to identify unauthorized usage and 
mishandling of computer system networks [10]. In addition, 
ID identifies the activity of malicious attackers. It is critical to 
implement ID in computer networks that have high traffic 
and high-speed connectivity [11, 12]. 
4. Cisco ASA 5500 
The ASA 5500 series is a range of essential Cisco 
products that can secure an organisation’s network from end 
to end, and comes in different sizes. The scalability of the 
ASA 5500 series provides a vast range of effective security 
solutions. It has therefore been a top choice for network 
designers for its high performance, and many vendors are 
now trying to produce security appliances that can protect 
networks [13]. 
This paper which builds on our previous work [12], 
describes research which uses Snort IDS, the most popular 
Network Intrusion Detection System (NIDS) software. Snort 
can be installed in any machine that runs on different 
operating systems such as Windows, Linux, etc. Snort was 
introduced as a lightweight IDS and has developed 
significantly in the last 10 years.  
We conducted some experiments to test Snort NIDS 
analysis performance under heavy and high-speed traffic. We 
also demonstrated that Snort NIDS’s performance can 
increase the number of analysed packets and decrease the 
number of dropped packets using alternative technologies 
such as a Quality of Service (QoS) configuration and parallel 
NIDS technology. In this paper, we will outline some 
concepts related to Network Intrusion Detection and 
Prevention System techniques used to mitigate security 
problems and risks. 
The remaining part of this paper is organized as follows: 
Section II gives a background about security stages and IDS 
technologies. Section III offers a detailed discussion of IDS 
methodologies, while Section IV covers the major 
components of NIDS. Section V explains our experimental 
design and implementation; covering details about 
experiment devices and tools. Section VI presents the metrics 
approach used in the evaluation of our experiments. Section 
VII presents the results of the experiments and the evaluation. 
Section VIII gives an overview related work. Finally Section 
IX concludes the paper and suggests recommendations and 
further work.  
II. BACKGROUND 
Security is a major concern in every aspect of our daily 
life. New methods and equipment are always being devised to 
ensure protection; similarly, computer networks continue to 
face many threats [2].  
There are usually three stages to achieving security in 
computer system networks: prevention, detection and 
correction [14]. Prevention stops attacks before they enter 
system, Detection catch the attacks after they have entered 
and then Correction rectifies problems, which could be 
detected attacks or mistakenly prevented non-attacks. 
 Prevention is the ideal solution, as compared to detection 
and correction, but it is impossible to prevent 100 percent of 
attacks [15, 10]. Moreover, detection techniques provide 
more accurate results in deterring malicious attackers than 
correction techniques. 
The correction technique is used to protect computer 
systems. Along with the prevention technique, it actively 
works to block intrusions, but it can continue to battle a 
successful intrusion [12]. Nevertheless, a number of 
successful attacks can be controlled using the prevention 
technique if an attack is detected at the interim stage. This is 
difficult, because some successful attacks can get through the 
prevention system [16, 17]. It is a matter of a system being 
attacked, compromised, and consequently malfunctioning. 
Here we need an interim stage, such as the detection phase, 
which should be activated by intrusions. The detection 
method is preferred as it minimizes network costs and fills in 
the gap between correction and prevention mechanisms.  
1. Intrusion prevention system technology (IPSs) 
The IPS is the advanced version of the ID scheme 
comprised of a router, a firewall, and the filtering of a 
network layer. This technology helps to make a network more 
secure. IPSs filter traffic, determining whether to allow it to 
pass or to block it if it contains malicious viruses. They are 
also useful in combating flood-type attacks, including 
Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) and DoS [1]. 
The weaknesses of IDS (such as overhead on monitored 
system , performance in high speed network, false positive 
alert, protection against new attacks and others) resulted in 
research that has lead to the development of IPs [12, 18, 19], 
which are in-line, active devices that can drop packets or stop 
connections that are malicious before they reach their targets. 
IPs need to be configured properly to achieve the desired 
output. There are three classifications of IP: 
 those that can stop an attack themselves; 
 those that can alter attack contents; and 
 those that can change the security environment [18, 
19]. 
2. IDS technology 
A firewall is not useful for attacks launched within a 
network, as it cannot detect the intrusion; it just drops the 
packets. For this reason, a more powerful tool is required. 
IDSs are more enhanced and better-developed security tools 
than firewalls. A useful analogy for an IDS is to think of it as 
a burglar alarm [20]. 
This technology detects unauthorized intrusions of the 
network or host that could damage or compromise network 
devices. If it finds any unusual activity, it sends the 
suspicious activity to the monitoring centre. The analysis and 
translation of network events and traffic is performed by this 
technology. It also has access to a database containing the 
signatures and profiles of known attackers or malicious 
behaviours, where it can compare any kind of suspicious 
activity to the one stored in their database, which helps in 
reacting to these activities, including shutting down a 
connection, alerting who to an attack, and logging activity for 
further investigation [3, 21]. 
IDSs are still unable to control all threats and malicious 
activities [3, 12, 16, 18]. To overcome the design and 
implementation difficulties, novel IDS outcomes have been 
obtained from multiple characteristics of advanced computer 
networks: 
 processing in real time; 
 high speeds and high loads; 
 increasing difficulties for defenders; and 
 reducing difficulties for attackers. 
3. Intrusion detection and prevention system (IDPS) 
technologies 
Intrusion detection and prevention system (IDPS) 
technologies may be software, hardware, or a combination of 
both. Snort, a tool that can be used in both IDSs and IPSs, 
and can perform packet sniffing or real-time analysis on local 
area networks [22]. 
Some of the existing types of IDSs are: network-based 
(NIDS); host-based (HIDS); graph-based IDS (GrIDS); and 
hybrid-based. 
A) Network-based IDSs 
A Network Intrusion Detection System (NIDS) is a 
common technique used to analyse traffic at all Open 
Systems Interconnection (OPI) layers by detecting the 
presence of normal traffic or suspicious activities [23]. 
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Figure 2: An Example of Network-Based IDS 
A disadvantage of NIDS is that it is usually unable to 
execute entire network packets, which results in incomplete 
analyses and therefore considerable delays in high-speed and 
high-load environments [8, 12]. NIDS itself is affected by 
DoS and DDoS attacks, similar to those made against IP 
gateways. In addition, NIDS is unable to inspect encrypted 
network traffic (packets) due to being placed in the middle of 
a network connection. Therefore, an NIDS only works in 
network-based environments, not at the end points of a 
network [16, 17]. 
B) Host-based IDSs (HIDSs) 
A Host Intrusion Detection System (HIDS) is a software 
agent that can be installed in a particular computer in order to 
monitor and analyse events on that particular host to detect 
any suspicious behaviour [24]. 
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Figure 3: An Example of Host-Based IDS 
Advantages of HIDSs include: 
 They are capable of integrating code analysis, 
monitoring system calls, detecting buffer overflows, 
privileging misuse, privileging abuse, file systems, 
library lists, applications, system configurations, 
system log analyses, and many others [19]. These 
things can be done by HIDSs because they are 
designed to operate with a specific host and with 
respect to applications such as web servers, database 
servers, file servers, mail servers, and DNS servers. 
 They are often integrated into server software and 
can be relatively easily implemented to 
communicate with other network components and 
operating systems. 
 They can inspect encrypted traffic because they can 
analyze packets at the application ends [12]. 
Disadvantages of HIDSs include: 
 HIDSs consume computer system resources that are 
needed for services. 
 HIDSs may conflict with existing security policies 
(such as firewalls) and operating systems. 
 It is difficult for HIDSs to analyse intrusion attempts 
on multiple computers. 
 HIDSs can be very difficult to maintain in large 
networks with different operating systems and 
configurations. 
 HIDSs can be disabled by attackers once a system is 
compromised. 
 HIDSs require many hosts to reboot after a complete 
installation or an update [16]. 
 Many essential servers cannot support this 
operation. 
C) Graph-based IDSs (GrIDSs). 
Graph-based IDSs (GrIDSs) are designed to protect 
computer networks from large-scale malicious attacks, which 
severely affect computer networks. Network traffic and 
computers are linked through GrIDs. 
The advantages of GrIDSs are as follows: 
 it can gather data about computer activity and it 
helps to recognize comprehensive automated or 
coordinated attacks in real time; 
 it allows network systems to state and implement 
policies specifying which users are permitted to 
utilise the particular services of an individual host or 
group of hosts; 
 it determines and reports violations of the stated and 
recommended policy [25]; and 
 UNIX hosts are used to run GrIDSs, which are in 
turn connected to the Internet [26]. 
Assumptions made in this kind of system include: 
 The inclusion of related networks within a single 
organisation that has an independent infrastructure 
and sovereign departments. Despite this, it is even 
more difficult to picture how this system would 
work to gain insight into the working of the GrIDSs 
system in a modern and innovative enterprise 
environment. 
 No single component of the network is actively 
hostile, which is a problem because the IDS must be 
redesigned to operate in non-hostile situations. 
D) Hybrid-based IDSs  
A Hybrid Intrusion Detection System is technology that 
combines two or more IDSs in order to analyse, detect, and 
match any suspicious behaviour or signature malicious code 
that attempts to attack a network [11]. 
III. INTRUSION DETECTION SYSTEM METHODOLOGY 
Most existing NIDS utilize either misuse detection or 
non-regular detection. The technique of misuse detection is 
employed to find known intrusions and/or a pattern of 
signatures. Due to its reliance on signatures, its detection 
speed is quite fast and has a low false positive rate.  
The NIDS methodology is divided into the following four 
categories: 
1. Misuse / signature-based detection  
This type of detection system uses known signatures of 
malicious codes, which are stored in an IDS database. Well-
known patterns of attacks result from the use of malicious 
codes and known software vulnerabilities. 
This kind of detection system is highly efficient for use in 
a small NIDS or Host-based IDS. The major drawback of 
such a system is that its database must be regularly updated, 
resulting in an ever-increasing database that must include as 
many available signatures as possible [12, 18, 27]. 
2. Anomaly/statistical detection 
Anomaly/statistical detection is a comparison-based 
method which compares any activity to the profile for all 
possible learned actives through statistical data, facts and 
figures. There are two types of profile, fixed and dynamic. A 
fixed profile is the most efficient as compared to other 
schemes, because it terminates the occurrence of any unusual 
behaviour and it classifies the behaviour as anomalous. A 
dynamic profile cannot be created without an existing fixed 
profile; once the dynamic profile has been created, it allows 
the attacker to observe and alter his or her behaviour in long-
term activities [12, 18, 27].  
3. Protocol analysis detection 
This IDPS technique depends on the behaviour of the 
protocols. It observes the protocol behaviour and then 
compares it to those stored in its protocol behaviour database. 
It detects anomalies in the packet on the head part of the 
protocol. This technique is quite effective, but can be easily 
avoided by attackers working inside the protocol limitations 
[12, 20, 27].  
4. Hybrid methodologies 
This system is the combination of more than one 
technique. It combines two or more intrusion detection 
systems methodology in order to analys, detect and match 
any suspicious behaviour and signature malicious code that 
attempt to attack network. However, instead of identifying a 
single   intrusion, it detects multiple intrusions, thereby 
providing relatively better results as compared to other 
methods with greater strength [6, 12, 27]. 
IV. THE COMPONENTS OF NETWORK INTRUSION DETECTION 
SYSTEMS 
The functional components of IDSs are: events 
management, a data source, an analysis engine, and a 
response manager [18, 27]. 
1. Events management 
Events management gathers information on events to and 
from the monitoring system (see Figure 4). 
2. Data source 
The data source is the event generator, which is classified 
into the following four categories [27]: 
 application-based monitors; 
 host-based monitors; 
 target-based monitors; and 
 network-based monitors. 
The data source stores multiple events recorded by event 
management. 
3. Analysis engine 
The analysis engine collects data from the data source in 
order to analyse and determine whether the data is free of 
policy violations or other attacks. This engine can utilize 
anomaly/statistical detection, misuse/signature-based 
detection, or both [27]. The analysis engine processes events 
and transmits alerts.  
4. Response manager 
The response manager neutralizes an attack once it is 
detected. Any IDS, including HIDS or NIDS, can utilize this 
analysis system. The response manager responds to events 
and stops intrusions [27]. 
 
Figure 4: General Architecture for NIDSs 
V. EXPERIMENT DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION  
A) Experiment design 
A real network has served as a model for the purpose of 
analysis and data acquisition. The following factors have 
been taken in to consideration for this design: 
 manual data access; 
 configuration/setup; 
 cost-free tools; 
 availability of tutorials; and 
 support related to work 
In this study, we used several tools, including both 
software and hardware, to meet the objectives outlined in the 
introduction: Snort 2.9.4.6, which was issued in April 2013, 
was introduced as NIDSs software; a WinPcap tool to capture 
packets on Windows 7 and 8 operating systems; a 
NetScanPro tool to manage a certain type of traffic in the 
network; a Packet Generator tool to generate/send network 
traffic of different values and speeds per ms; a Cisco Catalyst 
3560 Series Switch, which supports QoS configuration; and a 
computer system consisting of a minimum of four PCs with 
VMware Virtual. Figure 5 shows the network design for the 
experiment. 
 
 
Figure 5: Experiment Network Design 
B) Snort component functions 
Snort is one of the easy to use and popular IDSs [28]. It is 
accessible free of cost and ranked among the top systems 
with the best features available nowadays. It was released as 
an open-source NIDS based on a rule-based IDS, which 
stored information in text files that can be modified by a text 
editor. Rules are grouped into categories, and the rules 
belonging to each category are stored as information in 
separate files, which are then integrated into the main 
configuration file named “snort.conf”. The data is captured in 
terms of the described rules, which are read at the 
initialization of the Snort and comprise the internal data 
structure [12, 20, 28].   
A Snort-based IDS consists of the following major 
components: 
 a packet decoder;  
 pre-processors; 
 a detection engine; 
 a logging and alerting system; and 
 output modules. 
 
Figure 6: Snort Architecture [16] 
The basic structure is represented in Figure 6. When a 
packet arrives at the network, Snort listens and captures 
packets. In the beginning, the packet decoder receives packets 
from multiple network interfaces such as Point-to-Point 
Protocol (PPP) or Ethernet and Serial-Line-Internet-Protocol 
(SLIP), then organises such packets for pre-processing using 
a detection engine [12, 28].  
The pre-processor filters quickly organise and modify the 
data packets before transferring them to a detection engine, 
such as multiple UDP and/or TCP packets and port numbers 
[12, 20]. The pre-processor is very important part of any type 
of IDS to prepare data packets to be analysed against rules in 
the detection engine [28]. The detection engine performs 
three main tasks: sniffing, analysis and detection. The 
detection engine can be used to perform any one of the three 
tasks.  
The detection engine is time-critical and the most 
important part of the Snort. It utilizes different processing 
times based on the length of the packet, the specifications of 
the system, and the number of rules defined in the system. 
Snort drops few packets because it runs in real time if the 
operation is in NIDS mode, as with heavy and high-volume 
traffic [12, 20].  
This technique employs the Snort rule to detect intrusive 
actions to be presented in the data packet. In the detection 
mode, Snort rule is capable of reading chains (internal data 
structures), which have to be matched against all packets. If a 
packet does not match any rule, it will be dropped; otherwise 
appropriate action is taken [12, 20, 28]. 
Logging and alerts depend on the nature of what is 
detected inside the packets. If any suspicious activity is found 
inside a packet, the packet usually logs the malicious activity 
and/or generates an alert. Logs are usually stored in simple 
text-based files such as tcp-dump-style, etc. [12, 20].  
Output modules (plug-ins) are capable of performing 
multiple operations depending on the results generated by the 
logging and alerting system of Snort. In general, output 
modules control the form of outcome produced by the 
logging and alerting system [12, 20]. 
C) Cisco Catalyst 3560 Series switches    
This category belongs to layer 2 and 3 switches. It 
provides support for IP-based software, for example Rate 
limiting, Access Control Lists (ACLs), QoS. IPv6, and 
advanced routing protocols. Policy and class enterprise 
features are supported by IP service software. Despite a 
packet’s size and content, this switch provides the best effort 
services for each packet of network traffic. The packets are 
sent with no surety of delay bounds, reliability, or throughput 
[13]. 
D) Quality of services (QoS) 
A QoS technique permits the control of traffic over a 
network and guarantees the throughput of traffic applications 
in terms of time scale. QoS is the performance of the network 
traffic over several technologies, including Asynchronous 
Transfer Mode (ATM), 802.1 networks, IP-routed networks, 
Frame relay, and Synchronous Optical Network (SONET) as 
seen from the user’s perspective. Furthermore, QoS can use 
congestion avoidance and management techniques along with 
configuration of network traffic, and prioritizes traffic based 
on its importance [29]. 
QoS features can be classified into the following 
functions: 
 classification and marking; 
 policing; 
 congestion management; and 
 congestion avoidance. 
The features of QoS provide better and more reliable network 
services through the following features: 
 support for dedicated bandwidth; 
 improved loss characteristics; 
 management and avoidance of network congestion; 
 shaping network traffic; and 
 Setting traffic priorities across the network. 
VI. EXPERIMENT PERFORMANCE METRICS APPROACH 
The performance metrics are used in the experiments to 
measure the ability of a NIDS to perform a particular task and 
to fit within the performance constraints. These metrics 
measure and evaluate the parameters that impact NIDS 
performance. The measure metrics of experiments were used 
are defined as the following below: 
1. Packets generators 
The performance of TCP, UDP, and ICMP protocols was 
measured when running over the IPv4 header. WinPcap and 
Packets Generator tool were used to vary the type of traffic in 
term of IP header protocol (TCP, UDP and ICMP), speed, the 
number of packets and packet size. 
2. Timing statistics 
The Snort processor time includes total seconds and 
packets as well as packets processing rates. 
3. Packets I/O totals 
These are the percentages of the total packets processed 
by Snort. The specific metrics used are shown in the table 1.  
 
Table 1. Snort performance metrics 
Performance 
metrics 
Description 
Packets 
received 
The number of packets received by 
Snort. 
Packets 
analysed 
The percentage of packets analysed from 
the total packets received. 
Packets 
dropped 
The percentage of packets dropped from 
the total packets received. 
Packets 
filtered 
Packets are not shown for snort. 
Packets 
outstanding  
The number of the packets buffered 
waiting processing /or not processed. 
Packets 
injected 
Injected packets are the result of active 
response, which can be configured for 
inline or passive modes. 
4. Protocol statistics 
 All traffic for all protocols decoded by Snort are 
summarized in the breakdown section includes categorises 
such as Eth (Ethernet interfaces); VLAN; IP4; Frag 
(Fragmented packages); ICMP; UDP; TCP and others. 
5. Snort-NIDS throughput 
This metric defines the level of traffic up to which the 
NIDS performs without dropping any packets. These metrics 
are affected by the use of QoS configuration and parallel 
technology. 
VII. EXPERIMENT RESULTS AND  EVALUATION 
Snort is capable of performing real-time traffic analysis 
and packets logging on the network. It is a multimode packet 
sniffing, analysis and detecting tool. It can perform network 
traffic analysis and content searching/matching in both real-
time and for forensic post-processing [22, 28]. However, our 
work has focused on the Snort capability as a Network based-
IDS (NIDS). NIDS mode enables Snort to analyse the 
network traffic against a set of defined rules in order to detect 
intrusion threats. In our experiments, described later, we 
concentrate on the analysis function of the detection engine. 
The purpose of the experiments is: 
1) To show how Snort-NIDS performance under (a) 
high speed traffic (experiment 1), (b) heavy 
traffic (experiment 2) and (c) large data traffic 
(experiment 3). 
2) To show how QoS configuration, which offers 
queue technology improve performance of Snort 
NIDS (experiment 4). 
3) To show how parallel technology and QoS 
improve performance of Snort NIDS 
(experiment 5). 
A) Experiment 1. Snort-NIDS reactions to high-speed 
network traffic 
We used NetScanPro tools to manage IP traffic in the 
network and the packet generator tool to send a number of IP 
packets in different speeds per ms. We sent 13,000 1kb 
packets at different time intervals. Table 2 and Figures 7, 8 
and 9 show the results of our experiments.   
 
 
Figure 7: Snort Reaction to IP Header in 8ms 
 
 
Figure 8: Snort Reaction to IP Header in 4 ms 
 
 
Figure 9: Snort Reaction to IP Header in 1 ms 
 
Table 2. Same Value (Number of Packets) and Different 
Speeds 
Packets sent 
(13,000) 
8ms 
interval 
4ms 
interval 
1ms 
interval 
Packets received 100% 100% 100% 
Packets analysed 99.992% 62.165% 16.070% 
Packets dropped 0.00% 27.449% 45.631% 
Packets filtered 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Packets outstanding  0.008% 37.835% 83.930% 
Packets injected 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
 
As demonstrated in the results shown in Figures 7, 8, and 
10, all the packets that were sent reached the wire. Snort 
analysed 99.992 percent of the packets in incoming traffic 
when packets were transmitted in 8ms intervals (see Figure 
7), but when the speed of transmission was increased to 4ms, 
Snort started dropping packets, analysing only 62.168 percent 
and dropping more than 22 percent of the total packets 
received (see Figure 8). When the speed of transmission 
interval was increased to 1ms, Snort dropped more than 45 
percent of packets (see Figure 9). Our experiment 
demonstrated that Snort analysis performance was decreased 
as the traffic speed limit increased.  
B) Experiment 2. Snort-NIDS reactions to heavy-traffic 
networks. 
Here, the transmission rate of packets was kept to the 
same speed (1ms intervals) to obtain a fair analysis of 
different values (each packet carried 1kb). We sent 100, 500 
and 1000 packets batches at 1ms intervals. 
 
 
Figure 10. Snort Reaction to Heavy Traffic (100kb packets) 
 
 
Figure 11: Snort Reaction Heavy Traffic (500kb packets) 
 
 
Figure 12: Snort Reaction to Heavy Traffic (1000kb packets) 
 
Table 3. Same Speed Limit and Different Values 
Traffic speed(1ms) 100kb 500kb 1000kb 
Packets received 100% 100% 100% 
Packets analysed 100% 50.000% 30.482% 
Packets dropped 0.00% 33.333% 41.009% 
Packets filtered 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Packets outstanding  0.00% 50.000% 69.518% 
Packets injected 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
 
As demonstrated by the results shown in Figures 10, 11, 
and 12, all the packets that were sent reached the wire. In 
Figure 10, when we sent 100 packets, Snort analysed 100% 
of the total packets that it received. As the number of packets 
increased to 500 and 1000, Snort started dropping packets 
(see Figures 11 and 12). Our experiment shows that as the 
number of packets increases, more packets are dropped. 
C) Experiment 3. Snort-NIDS reactions to large (length) 
packets 
For this experiment, the number of packets was kept to 
the same value (13,000) and the same speed (1ms) to obtain a 
fair analysis of different sizes (lengths) of packets. We 
increased the size of each packet sent to 1 byte, 400 bytes, 
and 800 bytes. 
 
 
Figure 13: Snort Reaction to Packet Sizes (1 byte) 
 
 
Figure 14: Snort Reaction to Packet Sizes (400 byte) 
 
 
Figure 15: Snort Reaction to Packet Sizes (800 byte) 
 
Table 4. Same Speed and Value but Different Size  
Packets sent 
(13,000kbp1ms) 
1 byte 400 
bytes 
800 
bytes 
Packets received 100% 100% 100% 
Packets analysed 100% 43.995% 24.437% 
Packets dropped 0.00% 35.899% 43.040% 
Packets filtered 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Packets outstanding  0.00% 56.005% 75.563% 
Packets injected 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
 
As shown in Figures 13, 14 and 15, when we sent 13,000 
packets in 1 ms, each packet carrying 1 byte, Snort analysed 
100 percent of the total packets received (see Figure 13). As 
the size (length) of the packets was increased to 400 bytes, 
Snort dropped more than 35 percent of them (see Figure 14), 
and when the packet size was increased to 800 bytes, Snort 
accordingly dropped more (See Figure 16). Our experiment 
demonstrated that more packets will be dropped as packet 
size increases. 
D) Experiment 4. Snort-NIDS using QoS configuration 
technology in high-speed traffic 
Critical analyses were done for experiments 1, 2 and 3 
(see Figures 16, 17 and 18 respectively). It was found that 
Snort performance analysis throughput was affected by high-
speed and heavy traffic, and more packets were dropped as 
the number and size of packets and the speed of traffic 
increased. Because Snort has a limited time to process and 
analyse any traffic successfully if a network’s traffic speed 
limit is higher than Snort’s limit, Snort will drop packets. 
To solve this problem, we used a Cisco Catalyst 3560 
Series switch, which supports QoS configuration, to load the 
traffic into a number of interfaces equally and divide traffic 
into streams in order to analyse each portion of traffic 
individually to determine whether it was free of malicious 
codes. We configured Snort and QoS to reorder and control 
traffic speed as a Snort effort, similar to processor time and 
load traffic.  
 
Figure 16: Snort Reactions to IP Headers with Increasing Traffic Speeds 
 
Figure 17: Snort Reactions to IP Headers with Increasing Traffic Values 
 
Figure 18: Snort Reactions to IP Headers with Increasing Packet Sizes 
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By default, Cisco switches work in layer 2, the Data Link 
layer and use the Class of Services (CoS) value [13, 29] (see 
Figure 19). In this layer commands support QoS 
configuration. To implement QoS based on the DiffServ 
architecture, which specifies that each packet be classified 
upon entry into the network and adjusted for different traffic 
speeds, we changed/classified the switch frame to the default, 
working from layer 2 to layer 3 by mapping the traffic values 
from CoS to Differentiated Services Code Point (DSCP) 
values. 
To give preliminary treatment to packets with the same 
class information and different treatment to packets with 
different class information, a class map and policy map 
functions can be used to classify traffic inside the switch [29]. 
Classification is the process of distinguishing one kind of 
traffic from another by examining fields in the packet. 
Classification occurs on the physical interface or on a per-
port, per-VLAN basis. 
 
 
Figure 19:. Place for CoSand DSCP Values 
CoS value: from 0 to 7, DSCP value: from 0 to 63 
Policing involves creating a policy that specifies the 
bandwidth limits for the traffic and applies it to the interface. 
Policing can be applied to a packet per direction and can 
occur on the ingress and egress interfaces. 
 
 
Figure 20: Snort with QoS Architecture 
 
One of the mechanisms that QoS offers is queue 
technology, which can give a switch a new logical 
throughput-traffic-forwarding plan [26, 29]. QoS offers two 
input queues (ingress queues) and four output queues (egress 
queues) at the physical output interfaces (ports and VLANs) 
[26, 29].  
As shown in Figure 20, we configured the switch to two 
input queues and four output queues, and each input queue 
has a policy (policy map) and marking (class map). We 
configured the bandwidth, threshold and priority for each 
input and output queue to treat traffic in the input and output 
queues. We also configured the speed limit for each ingress 
queue and egress queue using one of two functions inside the 
switch called Shaped or Share Round Robin (SRR) [26, 29].  
The Shaped function is only available on egress queues, 
and a queue reserves only a portion of a port’s bandwidth. 
SRR is available on both ingress and egress queues. It 
guarantees a queue a portion of a port’s bandwidth, but does 
not limit the queue to that guaranteed amount. 
However, the main idea here is to allocate a specific 
traffic weight and speed limit for each queue, which allows a 
number of packets to be sent at a specific time, thereby 
reducing traffic congestion even if the traffic is high-speed 
and heavy. 
As the results shown in Figure 21 demonstrate, Snort 
analysed 100 percent of the traffic that reached the wire, more 
than 13,000kbp1ms with 0.00 percent dropped. The results 
show that Snort performance analyses are significantly 
improved when using QoS technology. 
 
 
Figure 21: Snort with QoS Reactions to an IP Header in High-Speed and 
Heavy Traffic Networks. 
E) Experiment 5. Parallel Snort-NIDS with QoS technology 
in high-speed network traffic 
Other than the critical analysis shown in Figure 22 for 
experiments 1 and 4, when we sent 13,000kbp of packets at 
1ms in experiment 1, Snort dropped more than 45 percent 
(see Figure 9); however, when we used Snort with QoS in 
experiment 4, Snort dropped 0.00 percent (see Figure 21). 
However, the difference between experiments 1 and 2 is 
Snort’s processor times, which were 33s and 101s 
respectively (see Figure 22). 
 
 
Figure 22: Snort Processor Time (13000kb/1ms) 
 
Figure 23: Architecture for Parallel Snort-NIDS Using QoS and ACLs 
 
As a solution to reduce Snort’s processor time, we suggest 
using parallel NIDS technology and a QoS to increase NIDS 
performance analysis and decrease processor time. 
As we show in Figure 23, we configured and treated 
traffic using QoS configuration, which can parallel traffic 
inside output queues and then scan each queue individually 
using an access list function (ACL).  
 
Using an ACL and QoS configuration, you can analyse 
and classify a separate type of traffic to separate the output 
queue. In this experiment we increased the number of packets 
sent to 40,000kbp/1ms. 
 
 
Figure 24: Snort without QoS. 
 
 
Figure 25: Snort with QoS. 
 
As the results shown in Figures 24 and 25 demonstrate, 
when we tested Snort as normal without any traffic treatment, 
we sent nearly 40,000kb in 1 ms, Snort analysed 16 percent 
of the total packets received in 55s, but when we used a 
single Snort-NIDS with a QoS configuration and sent the 
same packets (40,000kb in same speed 1ms), Snort analysed 
all the packets that reached the wire in 302s without dropping 
any.  
Using parallel NIDS technology (in three queues), Snort 
analysed 100 percent of the packets in less time (103s). Our 
experiments prove that Snort performance analysis improves 
significantly using QoS and parallel NIDs technology; it has 
processed more than 40,000kbp1ms in 103s with 0.00 percent 
dropped (see Figures 26, 27).  
 
 
Figure 26. Paralell Snort with QoS 
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Figure 27: Snort Processor Time for 40,000kb sending in 1ms 
A summary of our experiments is to increases the 
analytical performance of a Snort NIDS to guarantee the 
Quality of Service (QoS) by parallel technologies in Cisco 
Catalyst Switches. These experiments demonstrate the 
weaknesses of NIDSs, such as inability to process multiple 
packets and propensity to drop packets in heavy traffic and 
high-speed networks by incorporating various designs a real 
network to present experiments. 
It is important to note that when you test Snort with a QoS 
configuration under different processors, the QoS 
configuration will be different depending on which type of 
processor is running Snort, specifically its speed (see Figure 
28). 
Here we tested Snort at the same speed and for the same 
values, but with different processors: the Intel Pentium® D 
CPU 2.2GHz, the Intel® corei5 2.27GHz and the Intel® 
corei7 2.40GHz. Snort performance analysis was affected: it 
performed better with the Intel® core i7 processor than the 
others. 
 
 
 
Figure 28: Snort Used with Different Processors 
VIII. RELATED WORK 
Due to the fact that numerous computer systems are 
unable to detect or prevent threats such as DoS/DDoS attacks, 
the impacts of these kinds of attacks are immeasurable and 
irremediable. Such attackers amend, steal and destroy 
valuable information, and at worst damage a victim’s 
computer system [12]; their main purpose is to stop or slow 
down the performance of legitimate users’ computer network 
Systems by exploiting vulnerabilities such as mis-
configuration and software bugs generated from internal and 
external networks [12]. 
Despite the existence of a variety of security protections, 
attackers often attempt to render services merely unavailable 
to intended legitimate users [16]. Here, it is insufficient to 
depend only on prevention techniques, especially when an 
attacker has successfully obtained vulnerable information 
from the network, but prevention can successfully and 
effectively restore a network before an attack is launched. 
Several network-attacking techniques have been 
developed that enabled the researchers to conduct studies in 
order to prevent their network from being attacked. Many 
researchers are interested in IDSs due to their effectiveness in 
detecting attacks.  
Some researchers [3, 4, 6, 11] have used distinct 
technologies and methodologies to detect network attacks 
that occur in real time, using IDSs working in high-speed 
network connections that have heavy traffic and open-source 
software like Snort or other applications to enhance the 
analysis and detection of data, while the others [30, 31] have 
used comparisons between IDS tools to achieve the best 
throughput results with different IDSs. Our work addresses 
performance in a different way. It explores the use of parallel 
technology to improve QoS and then NIDS performance. 
Salah and Qahtan [32] implemented a hybrid scheme in 
Linux OS to prove that a hybrid scheme can improve the 
performance of general-purpose network desktops or servers 
running network I/O-band applications when such network 
hosts to both light and heavy traffic load conditions. The 
standard on subscribed configurations of Linux networking 
subsystems, as revealed by Salah and Qahtan [32], failed to 
meet Snort’s performance level. In order to achieve a high 
throughput of analysed traffic with Snort, they tuned the 
budget parameter of the Linux Network subsystem, which 
controls the utilization time of the central processing unit 
cycle. Our work at in explores configuration at a multi-layer 
switch, it is in the network based rather than the host based.  
Vasiliadis, Polychronakis, and Ioannidis [33] proposed a 
new model for a multi-parallel IDS architecture (MIDEA) for 
high-performance processing and stateful analysis of network 
traffic. Their solution offers parallelism at a subcomponent 
level, with NICs, CPUs and GPUs doing specialised tasks to 
improve scalability and running time. They showed that 
processing speeds can reach up to 5.2Gbit/S with zero packet 
loss in a multi-processor system. Their solution offers 
parallelism at a subcomponent level, with NICs, CPUs and 
GPUs doing specialised tasks. Our work has shown how QoS 
technology and parallelism can be impressive improving 
NIDS performance analyses in high speed and heavy traffic 
network. 
These improvements in the throughput of NIDS are 
achieved by pairing the ASA Cisco equipment with the 
Snorts. Vendor companies are trying to develop security 
solutions to protect the enterprise network [28, 34]. 
Equipment, including NIDSs, has been designed to meet 
connectivity speed and load standards—fast network 
connections are more vulnerable. 
Our approach differs from those of Salah and Qahtan [32], 
and Vasiliadis, Polychronakis, and Ioannidis [33] in that we 
have shown how QoS and paralleled NIDSs technology at a 
higher level of granularity in high-speed networks can make 
impressive improvements in increasing packets analysed and 
reducing the number of lost packets. 
IX. CONCLUSION, RECOMMENDATIONS AND FURTHER 
RESEARCH 
1. Conclusion 
For many years attacks made on networks have risen 
dramatically. The major reason for this is the unlimited 
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access to and use of software (written and uploaded to 
websites by technical experts) by inadequately trained people.  
Network disruptions may be caused intentionally by 
several types of directed attacks. These attacks are made at 
various layers in the TCP/IP protocol suite, including the 
application layer and IP. Besides the external body, attacks 
can be made on the network by the internal body as well.  
However, an IDS is considered to be one of the best 
technologies to detect threats and attacks. NIDSs attracted the 
interest of many organizations and governments, and any 
Internet user can deploy them. An NIDS usually features four 
stages to secure a computer system network: scanning, 
analysing, detecting, and correcting. Our paper focused on 
NIDSs’ weaknesses in scanning and analysing in high-speed 
network connectivity. We suggest using QoS configuration to 
improve NIDSs’ analysis performance and a parallel 
technology to reduce NIDSs’ processing time. As a result of 
the advance of our approach, anyone with a basic knowledge 
of computer networks can easily thwart an attack. 
2. Recommendations  
There is much yet to be learned about QoS technology. 
Some features of QoS may boost NIDSs performance, such 
as congestion management and congestion avoidance [32]. 
Congestion management is queuing (equal queuing), which 
evaluates the internal DSCP and determines which of the four 
egress queues in which to place the packets.  
There are many items to configure when it comes to 
queuing: defining the priority queue, defining a queue set, 
guaranteeing buffer availability, limiting memory allocation, 
specifying buffer allocation, setting drop thresholds, mapping 
CoS DSCP value to queues, configuring SRR, and limiting 
bandwidth on an outbound queue. Congestion avoidance is 
used with a weighted tail drop (WTD). A lot of things in 
congestion avoidance may help with NIDSs performance, 
such as setting output queuing, configuring WTD parameters 
to a four-queue set, WTD thresholds for a queue, guaranteed 
buffer availability for a queue’s maximum memory, 
allocation of a queue buffer for all output queues of an 
interface, etc. 
3.  Further research 
This paper is centred on the failure of IDSs to prevent 
attacks that comes in high speed network connectively. It is 
having a deep consideration of experiments to present the 
weakness of NIDS and to improve NIDS in terms of 
performance, efficiency and effectiveness. 
However, Multi-core technology is one solution for high-
speed data and network connectively [35]. Multi-core 
processors provide enhancement with high capabilities and 
secure networks from attacks, but they increase the 
complexity of the security system [36, 37 and 38]. 
This technology is an advancement in multi-processors, 
which improve setup in the speed and working of the 
systems. Advances in the utilisation of multi-processors have 
yet to be exploited; however, there are two major areas of 
concern in computer security: the speed and volume of 
attacks, and the complexity of multi-stage attacks. By using 
multi-core processors, we can look into some of the potential 
technological advancements in NIDSs that can be employed 
for beneficial purposes and objectives.  
 The current and anticipated future demands for online 
security require the re-manipulation of existing systems and 
the development of improved parallel systems and in order to 
meet the needs of and to comply with the multi-core systems 
of both today and the future.  
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